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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jacob Taylor Rainier appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of 
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Specifically, Rainier 
appeals the denial of his pretrial motions to dismiss and suppress. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Rainier with possession with the intent to deliver 
following a traffic stop of Rainier which led to the seizure of marijuana packaged 
for sale. (R., pp.48-49, 181-182; PSI, p.4.) 
Rainier filed a motion to dismiss the possession with intent charge, 
advancing his belief that marijuana should no longer be characterized as a 
schedule I controlled substance under I.C. § 37-2705, and as such he could not 
be charged under I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(B), a statute making it a crime to possess 
marijuana with the intent to deliver based on the schedule I classification of 
marijuana. (R., pp.60-66.) In denying his motion to dismiss, district court found 
unpersuasive Rainer's argument that because marijuana is legal in some states, 
it is no longer correctly classified as unaccepted for medicinal purposes under 
Idaho law and should therefore void the portion of the statute pertinent to 
Rainier's charges. (Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.12, L.2; R., pp.91-92.) 
Rainier also filed a motion to suppress, asserting the police officer "lacked 
reasonable, articulable suspicion to execute a warrantless traffic stop" of 
Rainier's vehicle. (R., p.50.) The officer testified at hearing that he pulled over 
Rainier's vehicle because he "observed a traffic violation, a left-hand turn that 
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was made into the far right-hand lane instead of the one available lane of travel." 
(Tr., p.18, Ls.17-20.) The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding the 
statute "does say you're supposed to turn into the left-hand lane or the fast lane." 
(Tr., p.54, Ls.1-3; R., pp.93-94.) 
The matter proceeded to trial where a jury returned a verdict of guilty to 
the charge of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance. (R., 
pp.226-227.) The court placed Rainier on a two-year period of supervised 
probation with an underlying sentence of two years fixed followed by two years 
indeterminate. (R., p.236.) Rainier timely appealed. (R., pp.241-244.) 
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ISSUES 
Rainier states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Whether marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance. 
II. Whether the courts can impose punishment on the basis of 
arbitrary law. 
Ill. Whether I.C. § 49-644 prohibits turning left into any lane but 
the left-most. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Rainier failed to establish the district court erred in denying his motion 
to dismiss where the statute under which he was convicted of possession 
with the intent to deliver is clear on its face? 




Rainier Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion 
To Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Rainier's motion, holding I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(B) 
is not "void for absurdity." (Tr., p.11, L.25.) In reaching its conclusion, the court 
recognized its inability to "ignore the clear written rules of law of the state" in 
order to "reclassify marijuana." (Tr., p.11, Ls.20-22.) 
Rainier contends that the district court erred because applying I.C. § 37-
2732(a)(1 )(B) as written would lead to an absurd result. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-
12.) Rainier argues, without authority, that because other states have legalized 
the use of marijuana, the Idaho statute should no longer classify it as a schedule 
I controlled substance. (Appellant's brief, 7-9.) Rainier acknowledges the Court 
"cannot itself reschedule cannabis to schedule II," but asserts the statute as 
currently written cannot be enforced. (Appellant's brief, p.11.) Because the 
statute itself is clear and unambiguous, Rainier's argument fails. His position 
would be more properly advanced through his local legislator. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The meaning and effect of a statute, including the statute's 
constitutionality, is a question of law over which the appellate courts exercise free 
review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001 ). 
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C. The District Court Correctly Concluded The Statute Rainier Was 
Convicted Under Is Clear On Its Face 
It is axiomatic and long-established that a statute will be interpreted 
according to its plain language and that where the language is plain the court will 
not resort to principles of statutory construction. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 
360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 
578, 581 (1996). "When a statute is unambiguous, it must be interpreted in 
accordance with its language, courts must follow it as enacted, and a reviewing 
court may not apply rules of construction." State v. Wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189, 
191, 824 P.2d 120, 122 (1992) (citations omitted). 
Idaho Code § 37-2732(a)(1)(8) prohibits the delivery of a schedule I 
nonnarcotic drug. I. C. § 37-2705(d)(30) classifies marijuana as a schedule I 
controlled substance. Under the plain language of these statutes, delivery of 
marijuana is criminalized under I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(8). 
Although Idaho Code § 37-2705(d)(30) unambiguously classifies 
marijuana as a schedule I controlled substance, Rainier contends that the plain 
language does not control because it leads to an absurd result: 
Passed long ago in a different time, administered by an agency that 
failed to reschedule cannabis as it ceased to meet the requirements 
laid out by the legislature, the [Uniform controlled Substances] Act 
has become, as it applies to cannabis, absurd. 
(Appellant's brief, p.11.) Rainier acknowledges "a court in Idaho cannot itself 
reschedule cannabis to schedule II," but argues it "may not enforce a law that 
has no sense" and as such, Rainier's "case should have been dismissed." 
(Appellant's brief, p.11.) 
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While the Idaho Supreme Court has previously "responded to arguments 
that the wording of an unambiguous statute would produce an absurd result," the 
Court recently recognized that they "have never agreed with such arguments." 
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896, 265 
P.3d 502, 509 (2011) (citations omitted). The Court continued: 
Thus, we have never revised or voided an unambiguous 
statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce 
absurd results when construed as we do not have the authority to 
do so. The public policy of legislative enactments cannot be 
questioned by the courts and avoided simply because the courts 
might not agree with the public policy so announced. Indeed, the 
contention that we could revise an unambiguous statue because 
we believed it was absurd or would produce absurd results is itself 
illogical. A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of 
more than one reasonable construction. An unambiguous statute 
would have only one reasonable interpretation. An alternative 
interpretation that is unreasonable would not make it ambiguous. If 
the only reasonable interpretation were determined to have an 
absurd result, what other interpretation would be adopted? It would 
have to be an unreasonable one. 
kl (citations omitted). 
Therefore, because I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(B) unambiguously applies to the 
possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, neither a district court nor an 
appellate court may alter that statute to change the classification of marijuana on 
the ground that applying I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(B) as written would lead to absurd 
results. Idaho Code § 37-2732(a)(1)(B) unambiguously applies to the 
possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver. Reclassification of marijuana 
must be addressed through the pharmacy board and/or the legislature and 
Rainier has provided no authority otherwise. The district court was therefore 
correct in denying Rainier's motion to dismiss. 
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11. 
Rainier Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
A Introduction 
Rainier challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing as he did 
below that the traffic "stop in this case was made without reasonable and 
articulable suspicion of a law violation." (Appellant's brief, p.16.) Specifically, he 
contends that although he "had turned left from a lane specifically intended for 
such turns into the right-most lane" (Appellant's brief, p.13), this did not violate 
I.C. § 49-644 which provides for a left-hand turn being made into the "extreme 
left-hand lane" (Appellant's brief, p.13). Rainier's argument fails. The district 
court correctly interpreted I.C. § 49-644(2) as "say[ing] you're supposed to turn 
into the left-hand lane or the fast lane" after making a left turn, instead of 
"cross[ing] over and turn[ing] into the right hand lane or the slow lane." (Tr., p.53, 
L.6 - 54, L.3.) Because the officer observed Rainier make a "left turn, but 
instead of turning into the closest left land available nearest the center of the 
road, turned into the far outside lane nearest the sidewalk," (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-4), 
the officer had a reasonable, articulable basis to conduct the traffic stop. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate court 
accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial 
evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those 
facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796,798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004). 
C. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding 
That The Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Rainier Because He 
Violated The Turning Requirements Of I.C. § 49-644(2) 
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). 
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be 
reasonable. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop, 
146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory 
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by 
an officer's reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is 
about to commit, a crime. Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811,203 
P.3d at 1210. "An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal 
behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being 
driven contrary to traffic laws." Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing 
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United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)). "Reasonable suspicion requires 
less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the 
officer." State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(citation omitted). Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is 
evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or 
before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811,203 P.3d at 1210; State v. 
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Deputy Bates stopped Rainier after observing him make a left-hand turn 
into the far right-hand lane. (Tr., p.18, Ls.18-20.) Idaho Code§ 49-644 governs 
required position and method of turning on Idaho highways and provides, in 
relevant part: 
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left shall approach the turn 
in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in 
the direction of travel of the vehicle. Whenever practicable the left 
turn shall be made to the left of the center of the intersection and so 
as to leave the intersection or other location in the extreme left-
hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction 
on the highway being entered. 
§ 49-644 (2). The district court found the plain language of this statute required a 
left-hand turn be made into the left-hand lane of travel. (Tr., p.54, Ls.1-3.) 
Deputy Bates observed Rainier make a "very wide, unsafe left-hand turn" (Tr., 
p.19, L.25) into the far right-hand lane, where it was "encroaching on another 
lane" (Tr., p.20, L.5). Rainier argues that requiring a left-hand turn from an 
intersection be made into the left-hand lane instead of crossing over adjoining 
lanes does not promote safety and is therefore not what the statute clearly 
provides. (Appellant's brief, p.16.) 
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The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because the 
best guide to legislative intent is the wording of the statute itself, the 
interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words. Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg'I Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011); State 
v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). The words of a statute 
'"must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be 
construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not 
construe it, but simply follows the law as written."' Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 
P.3d at 506 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 
(2003)). "[W]here statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and 
other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the 
clearly expressed intent of the legislature." lQ.,. (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun 
Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665,667,851 P.2d 961,963 (1993)). 
The language of the statute in question is unambiguous. When making a 
left-hand turn from the extreme left-hand turning lane, the turn should be made 
"to the left of the center of the intersection" and into what constitutes the "extreme 
left-hand lane" "[w]henever practicable." I.C. § 49-644 (2). The plain language of 
the statute clearly directs a driver to turn from the extreme left-hand lane to the 
extreme left-hand lane when practicable. Rainier did not do that. Instead, he 
made an unsafe and too-wide turn from the extreme left-hand lane to the right-
hand lane, "encroaching on" that lane and causing a dangerous situation where 
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vehicles in the right-hand lane could have "collided with [Rainier's] vehicle." (Tr., 
p.20, Ls.1-6.) 
Because it is undisputed that Rainier turned from the extreme left-hand 
lane into the right-hand lane when he could have turned into the extreme left-
hand lane, the district court correctly upheld the traffic stop as being justified by a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Rainier violated I.C. § 49-644(2). Rainier 
has failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this to affirm Rainier's judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
DATED this yth day of Apri 
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